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also discover it than that Snellius and Descartes discovered it independently at about the same time. There is therefore no need to appeal to plagiarism to explain the coincidence.

Of the two remaining chapters, the "Laws of Movement and the Philosophy of Leibniz" is a valuable synthesizing of the scientific and the metaphysical side of this author for it traces his turnings in trying to avoid the mechanical difficulties of the Cartesian dualism between mind and body, and studies the peculiar concept of force at which he arrived through this effort.

The last chapter, on Descartes and Newton, examines the propriety of ascribing to either exclusively the title of 'Father of Modern Science.' Newton seems to be the more modern, for he is not mechanistic in the sense that Descartes is, and, for him, science has already ceased to be a system of explanation, to become merely representation, while Descartes seeks explanations by the help of definitions which he seeks to impose on facts, and does not always separate metaphysics from mechanics. The question is insoluble, however, for Descartes and Newton represent two different aspects of the scientific mind. While the latter aims at observation of experience, the former intends primarily anticipation; so they complete each other. Neither of them understood the movement of which he was a part.

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Manual of Mental and Physical Tests. By GUY MONTROSE WHIPPLE. Baltimore, Warwick & York, 1910.—pp. xix, 534.

The author's purpose is to bring together tests that have been actually used in physical and mental measurements, to make them available for other workers and to compare and sift out those that are most promising for future work. In furtherance of this ideal he has presented what is perhaps the most comprehensive discussion of tests in English or for that matter in any language. Fifty-four tests are described under thirteen different chapter titles. Aside from the more usual mental tests there is a preliminary chapter on the treatment of measures which gives not only an outline of the theory of probabilities as applied to measurements, but a treatment of the various measures of correlation on the basis of the work of Pearson, Spearman, Thorndike and the author. The next chapters are devoted to anthropometric measurements and physical tests. The following chapter on Sensory Capacity includes tests of muscular defects of the eye as well as the more usual tests of sensory acuity. In these earlier chapters much material is presented that is useful to the teacher. For the psychologist, there is much material that is not within his immediate province, and should prove sufficient to guide him when his problems lead, as so often they do, into the realm of physiology. In the later chapters full description is given of the methods of report or *Aussage*, and of the graded tests of de Sanctis and of Binet and Simon. No important field of investigation is omitted.

Each test is accompanied by a full bibliography and the results of the more important investigations have been given, so that the *Manual* becomes at once a manual and a handbook of results. The directions for the conduct of the tests are reasonably full—full enough to save the tyro from many mistakes, although of course no book can give the full spirit of scientific work or prevent the bungler or slip-shod worker from falling into error. In the selection of tests the author has been most catholic. He has excluded no variant that seems at all promising, and has perhaps erred, if at all, on the side of admitting too many rather than by excluding any that may prove valuable. The tests chosen are, on the whole, those that can be made with relatively simple apparatus, although no sacrifice of accuracy to simplicity has been made. A complete list of the apparatus required is given and arrangements have been made with a well-known firm to supply both apparatus and material. This should add greatly to the usefulness of the book, particularly for those who have not at their disposal a fully equipped laboratory or are little familiar with apparatus.

The author is to be congratulated on providing so convenient a work of reference for those more familiar with the subject at the same time that he has prepared a guide for the beginner in mental measurements.

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La Conscience de devoir dans l'introspection provoquée. Par PIERRE BOVET. Genève, Kundig, 1910.

This is a study in the psychology of ethics by the professor of philosophy at the University of Neuchâtel. It forms the second stage in the execution of a plan which the author intends to complete, by publishing a treatise on the moral sentiments. The first stage consisted of a series of experiments made by Professor Bovet in the Geneva psychological laboratory. These were repetitions of those already conducted by Messner and Bühler, similar to those made by Ach and by Michotte and Prüm at Louvain.

In this monograph, the author proceeds to discuss some of the results hitherto obtained. It must be taken as a report of progress and not as a completed theory. As the title indicates, it is an application of the experimental method to the analysis of the "sense of oughtness" or duty. Instead of relying on the independent introspection of the observer, the author employs a more objective method. The problem is to discover what happens in the mind when it is provoked from without, to know, feel or do, by what Professor Bovet calls *la consigne* or command (*die Aufgabe* of Ach). By studying these individual cases, the laws of psycho-ethical phenomena are to be ascertained. The command is given by the experimenter: the effects of the command in consciousness are reported by the person experimented upon. An essential element of the reaction in the consciousness of the person experimented upon, is not only that something is known, but that something has to be done.

The first part of the book is devoted to a discussion of the nature of the *consigne* or command, as related to the experimenter and to the subject—